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Discussion 250 word annotated bibliography The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law Should (Try To) Do about It Heather A. Harrison Dinn

Discussion 250 word annotated bibliography The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law
Should (Try To) Do about It

Heather A. Harrison Dinn

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Discussion 250 word annotated bibliography The Threat of Cyber Terrorism and What International Law
Should (Try To) Do about It

Heather A. Harrison Dinniss

Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, Volume 19, Fall 2018, pp. 43-50
(Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:

For additional information about this article

[ Access provided at 26 Apr 2021 18:42 GMT from ProQuest Information & Learning ]

https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2018.0006

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/709949

https://doi.org/10.1353/gia.2018.0006

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/709949

f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 43

The Threat of
Cyber Terrorism
and What
International Law
Should (Try To)
Do about It
Heather A. Harrison Dinniss

The specter of cyber terrorism is one that has been both bandied and se-riously debated since at least the
late 1990s. Certainly, by the end of 2017,
it looked as if the era of hackers accessing
and manipulating critical infrastructure for
political purposes, the most likely mecha-
nism for conducting a cyber-terrorist act,
had truly arrived. Electrical blackouts had
been caused in successive years in Ukraine,1
North Korean hackers had breached an
American energy utility,2 and Russian hack-
ers had penetrated not only a nuclear power
plant but had obtained hands-on access to
an American energy utility’s control sys-
tems.3 More disturbingly in an escalation of
these types of cyber-attacks, reports emerged
of an advanced attack against a petrochemi-
cal company with a plant in Saudi Arabia,
apparently designed to sabotage the firm’s
operations and trigger a lethal explosion.4
Similar (non-cyber related) explosions at
petrochemical plants in China and Mexico
resulted in the deaths of several employees,

injured hundreds, and forced evacuations of
surrounding communities. While all of the
investigators involved in the matter believe
the attack was most likely intended to cause
a fatal explosion, they have all been tight-
lipped about any suspected perpetrator of
the attacks and even the company affected.
The fact of the compromise of the widely
used Schneider Triconex safety controllers
raises uncomfortable speculation about who
was behind the attack and for what purpose.

It is no secret that terrorist organizations
such as the so-called Islamic State (IS or its
Arabic acronym Daesh) have made great
strides in utilizing information and commu-
nication technologies (ICTs) for encrypted
communications, recruitment, propaganda,
and fundraising. However, to date, no ter-
rorist group appears to have utilized these
technologies to directly launch an attack.
In April 2015, it appeared that this pat-
tern had changed. TV5Monde, a French
television network, was attacked, shutting
down broadcasting across eleven of the net-
work’s channels and hijacking their associ-
ated websites and social media accounts. A
group calling itself the “Cyber Caliphate,”
an IS-associated group, claimed responsi-
bility for the attack and made clear links to
the terrorist attacks that had shaken France
three months previously as well as the Char-
lie Hebdo killings.5 For a country already
shaken by these kinetic terrorist attacks,
the message was clearly intimidatory: “The
CyberCaliphate continues its cyberjihad
against the enemies of Islamic State.” So-
cial media profile pictures were replaced by
pictures of a masked Islamist fighter. Posts
imploring soldiers to save their families were

Heather a. Harrison Dinniss is a senior lecturer at the International law centre of the swedish national Defence college.

she is the author of Cyber War and Laws of War (cambridge university Press, 2012), which analyses the status and

use of computer network attacks in international law and examines their treatment under the laws of armed conflict.

Heather has previously taught at the london school of economics & Political science (lse); the school of oriental and

african studies (soas), university of london; and Victoria university of wellington (nZ).

44 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s

H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s

accompanied by documents said to be iden-
tity cards belonging to relatives of French
soldiers taking part in anti-ISIS operations.6
French officials proclaimed terrorism and
the Paris prosecutor’s office opened a terror-
ism investigation into the attack.7
Only it wasn’t.

Subsequent forensic investigations led to
an advanced persistent threat team dubbed
APT28 or “Fancy Bear,” widely alleged to
be, or sponsored by, Russian military intel-
ligence; despite investigation, the reason for
the attacks remains unclear.8 These incidents
illustrate some of the many difficulties that
the international legal community is faced
with in formulating a response to cyber ter-
rorism. First is the lack of an agreed definition
of what acts or conduct might be included
in the term cyber terrorism. While domestic
terrorism legislation generally contains very
wide definitions of terrorist behavior,9 inter-
national law has no such general definition.
Second, the international community has
little to no agreement on what to do with
acts committed by elements of the state that
would amount to terrorism if committed by
private individuals or organized groups.

Definitions
The international legal response to terror-
ism generally has had a difficult gestation.
While states have attempted to agree on
comprehensive treaties and reforms since
the 1930s,10 entrenched disagreements have
instead resulted in a patchwork of sectoral
treaties dealing with different types of ter-
rorist acts and specific threats (e.g., the hi-
jacking of aircraft, hostage taking), regional
treaties (e.g., the ASEAN Convention on
Counter Terrorism), and UN Security
Council decisions. The coverage is far from
comprehensive even in relation to kinetic
threats and has left unresolved, inter alia,
the issues relating to state involvement in

terrorist acts (as well as by national libera-
tion movements).

The sectoral treaties were adopted on
an ad hoc basis in response to specific ter-
rorist threats that were of particular con-
cern to the international community at
the time. Neither the sectoral (or regional
treaties) adopt definitions of terrorism per
se, typically requiring states to criminalize
and prosecute certain tactics adopted by ter-
rorists, establish extraterritorial jurisdiction
over those offenses, and prosecute or extra-
dite those suspected of committing them.11
They are supplemented by a number of
binding United Nations Security Council
resolutions imposing obligations on states
in relation to terrorism-related offenses (for
example, terrorist financing). While many
of these instruments are broad enough to
incorporate cyber terrorism, only two of
the sectoral treaties mention it specifically.12
As Professor Ben Saul, an expert in inter-
national and counter-terrorism law, notes,
the sectoral treaties are squarely aimed at
physical attacks on protected targets or by
prohibited means.13 For the remainder, the
question of whether these treaties can be ap-
plied to cyber activities will depend on an
expansive interpretation of their terms, such
as whether malware falls within the defini-
tion of a device. For example, it is an of-
fense to place “by any means whatsoever” a
“device or substance” on an aircraft, ship, or
fixed platform where it is likely to endanger
its safety.14 Similarly, the Terrorist Bomb-
ings Convention 1997 makes it an offense

The international community has
little to no agreement on what to do

with acts committed by elements of the
State that would amount to terrorism
if committed by private individuals or

organized groups.

f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 45

t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t

to deploy an “explosive or other lethal de-
vice” in a public place, government facility,
on public transport, or in an infrastructure
facility with the intent to cause death or seri-
ous injury or extensive destruction resulting
in major economic loss.15 If one takes the
example of the August 2017 cyber-attack
against the Saudi petrochemical plant out-
lined above, there appears to be little doubt
that the intention was to cause an explosion.
The question of whether it would amount to
a terrorist bombing under the Convention
turns on whether the malware used (dubbed
Triton by investigators after the Tritonex
Safety controllers it was designed to dis-
rupt) can be considered a lethal device. The
Convention defines “other lethal device” as
one “designed or capable of causing death,
serious injury or substantial material dam-
age through the release, dissemination or
impact of toxic chemicals, biological agents
or toxins, radiation or other similar sub-
stances.” It will be entirely open to a court
to determine whether the code, apparently
designed to cause death or serious injury,
can fall within that definition through the
use of the petrochemicals already present at
the plant.

Despite the difficulties of interpretation,
it is clear that the current sectoral frame-
work already covers some present-day cyber-
attack scenarios. For example, the sectoral
treaties designed to protect civil aviation
may be readily applied to cyber-attacks.
Proof-of-concept cyber-attacks were car-
ried out by US Department of Homeland
Security experts against an aircraft in 2016
and individual researchers in 2015, and
have been warned against by cybersecurity
experts for many years.16 Cyber-attacks
against nuclear facilities may also fall foul
of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism
2005. The Convention makes it an offence
to use or damage a nuclear facility in a
manner that releases or risks the release of

radioactive material, or threatens to do so,
where the intent is to cause death or seri-
ous injury, to inflict substantial damage to
property or the environment, or to compel
a particular course of action. While to date
the reported cyber-attacks against nuclear
reactor facilities have involved only periph-
eral systems rather than critical ones, there is
no sign that hackers will not continue to at-
tempt to breach the more difficult to access
critical systems to use for political leverage.17

Beyond the sectoral framework, the
international community’s most recent
attempt to develop a comprehensive defini-
tion of terrorism has been under negotia-
tion since 2000. Designed to complement
the sectoral treaties prohibiting terrorism,
the definition of terrorism contained in the
UN Draft Comprehensive Convention on
International Terrorism is broad enough to
include cyber activities that are intended,
by their nature or context, to “intimidate
a population, or to compel a Government
or an international organization to do or to
abstain from doing any act.”18 The Conven-
tion makes it an offense in which a person
“unlawfully and intentionally” and “by any
means” causes death or serious bodily injury
to any person, serious damage to property,
or damage to property resulting, or likely to
result, in major economic loss.” The defi-
nition explicitly includes private property
within the scope of the offense (as opposed
to state-owned or governmental property).

While to date the reported cyber-attacks
against nuclear reactor facilities have

involved only peripheral systems rather
than critical ones, there is no sign that

hackers will not continue to attempt
to breach the more difficult to access

critical systems to use for political
leverage.

46 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s

H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s

Of particular relevance in relation to the
most widely anticipated cyber-attacks,
damage to infrastructure facilities including
communication, telecommunication sys-
tems, and information networks is specifi-
cally contemplated. Both the special intent
required and the damage level contemplated
by the Convention (death, serious injury or
damage, major economic loss) elevates the
type of cyber activities that would be cov-
ered by the offense above regular cyber-
crime or hacktivism. What, then, of the
TV5Monde attack? Leaving aside the ques-
tion of attribution and state involvement
for the meantime, is this an activity that
would correctly be regarded as terrorism
under the Convention? The financial cost
of the attack was €5 million ($5.6 million)
in the first year, followed by over €3 mil-
lion ($3.4 million) every following year for
new protection.19 This appears to fulfill the
criteria of major economic loss; TV5Monde
Director General Yves Bigot has also noted
that the attack came close to closing the
station for good because of lost contracts.
Had the attack been as it appeared, an at-
tack by the IS-affiliated CyberCaliphate,
accompanied by clear references to the pre-
vious terror attacks carried out by IS and
directly referencing France’s involvement
in the conflict in Syria, the criterion of in-
timidating the population or compelling a
government to abstain from an act would
also have been fulfilled. As noted previously,
one of the posts to TV5Monde’s Facebook
page during the attack purported to show
the identity cards and CVs of relatives of
French soldiers involved in anti-ISIS opera-
tions, along with threats against the troops
and their families: “Soldiers of France, stay
away from the Islamic State! You have the
chance to save your families, take advantage
of it.”20 Thus the TV5Monde attack, as it
first appeared, would have fallen within the
scope of the Draft Convention had it been

in force.21 However, as noted above, subse-
quent forensic investigation has shown that
IS was not behind the attack. Investigators
have linked the attack to APT28, otherwise
known as Fancy Bear, believed to be Rus-
sian military intelligence. With the actor
being the state armed forces, the calculation
changes dramatically.

State Involvement
One of the major obstacles in the negotia-
tion and implementation of terrorist regu-
lation has been the intractable problem of
how to deal with terroristic acts committed
by state actors (as well as national liberation
movements). With regard to the state actors,
it should be noted that the Draft Conven-
tion currently excludes the acts of state and
non-state armed forces in the context of an
armed conflict governed by international
humanitarian law. This is less of a concern
as both treaty and customary international
humanitarian law already prohibit attacks
whose primary purpose is to spread terror
among the civilian population in both in-
ternational and non-international armed
conflicts.22

Most relevant for attacks such as the TV-
5Monde example (and others attributed to
military-linked threat teams) is that Article
20(3) of the Draft Convention specifically
excludes “the activities undertaken by the
military forces of a State in the exercise of
their official duties, inasmuch as they are
governed by other rules of international
law.” Note that this includes peacetime ac-
tivities of the military forces. Instances such
as the TV5Monde attack are clearly gov-
erned by international law in that they con-
stitute interference in the domestic affairs of
another state, violate state sovereignty, and
may involve other internationally wrong-
ful acts that will incur the responsibility
of the state under international law. But

f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 47

t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t

under the current Draft Convention, the
perpetrators of the acts are precluded from
individual criminal responsibility for their
actions under international law. A similar
carve out for military forces engaged in offi-
cial duties (including in peacetime) exists in
some of the sectoral treaties—for example,
the nuclear treaty discussed above. Interest-
ingly, the carve out does not include actions
taken by other civilian intelligence agencies,
which would also include cyber activities.
The 2010 Stuxnet malware launched at the
Iranian Natanz uranium enrichment facility
caused significant damage to the centrifuges
at that facility, although there are no reports
of the release of radioactive material. It is
generally considered to be the work of the
US National Security Agency (NSA) under
the US Department of Defense and Israel’s

Unit 8200, both of which may be consid-
ered military intelligence agencies.

The Perception Problem and
Why New International Laws
(Probably) Won’t Help
As noted above the international commu-
nity has been working toward a comprehen-
sive terrorism regulation since the 1930s and
on drafting the current treaty for the past
eighteen years. Negotiations have stalled for
a variety of reasons, most notably the lack of
agreement about the role of state actors and,
until relatively recently, an agreed defini-
tion.23 In its place, the sectoral treaties have
addressed various types of terrorist activities,
usually in response to a terrorist incident or
incidents that have captured the attention
of the international community. However,
to date, there have not been any incidents of
terrorist groups using ICTs to directly carry
out their attacks. In the past, some have
questioned whether the groups involved
have the expertise or the inclination to carry
out acts of cyber terror.24 The extent of cyber
ability shown by some groups such as IS, the
expressed desire of those groups to launch
cyber-attacks, and the leaking of sophisti-
cated cyber weaponry (developed by state
actors and later reused in other attacks) indi-
cates that now it is probably simply a matter
of time before it happens. It must be ac-
knowledged that this view is not universally
held. The fact that the most pressing cyber
incidents are carried out by state actors who
are exempted from individual criminal re-
sponsibility for their actions by virtue of the
various terrorism treaties is unlikely to spur
states to draft a separate sectoral treaty gov-
erning acts of cyber terror (which is likely to
have to include the same exclusions).

As noted, the Draft Comprehensive Cy-
ber Treaty is broad enough to cover cyber ac-
tivities; however, it is still under negotiation.

One of the major obstacles in the
negotiation and implementation of

terrorist regulation has been the
intractable problem of how to deal with

terroristic acts committed by
state actors.

Instances such as the TV5Monde
attack are clearly governed by

international law in that they constitute
interference in the domestic affairs of

another state, violate state sovereignty,
and may involve other internationally

wrongful acts that will incur the
responsibility of the state under

international law. But under the current
Draft Convention, the perpetrators of
the acts are precluded from individual

criminal responsibility for their actions
under international law.

48 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s

H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s

It is unlikely that states, understanding that
the text is broad enough to cover cyber in-
cidents and having the majority of their
terror-related focus on more conventional
threats, will press for a separate cyber ter-
rorism treaty. In the meantime, states are
adopting domestic legislation that criminal-
izes the underlying cyber activities or adding
terrorism as an aggravating factor on existing
crimes. In contrast with its kinetic counter-
part, the tools used by cyber criminals and
cyber terrorists may be identical, the only
difference being the ideology and political
motivations behind the attacks of the latter
rather than the personal or financial aspects
of the criminal element.

The international legal response to cyber
terrorism is left in somewhat of a quandary.
In the absence of a serious cyber terror in-
cident to focus the political will of states,
those wishing to provide an international
framework for cyber terror regulation must
resort to soft law measures and work with
other like-minded actors to provide guide-
lines for future action. Such measures could
include a mutually agreed definition of cy-
ber terrorism, advice to the UN Sixth Com-
mittee Working Group on terrorism (tasked
with bringing the Draft Comprehensive
Convention to completion) to ensure that
it continues to encompass the threat of cy-
ber terrorism without being overly broad,
guidelines for drafting of domestic legisla-
tion, and mutual legal assistance governing

cyber terrorism, and perhaps even provide
draft elements of a Security Council resolu-
tion on the topic. For the rest, all that is left
is to stand ready . . . and wait.

Notes
1 . Andy Greenberg, “Crash Override Took

Down Ukraine’s Power Grid Last December,”
Wired, December 6, 2017, https: / /www .wired
.com /story /crash -override -malware / .

2 . While the level of penetration of this hack into
the (unnamed) energy company is disputed,
it is uncontested that North Korea was effec-
tively laying the groundwork required for any
subsequent use of cyber capabilities against US
energy utilities . Chris Bing, “Hackers Linked
to North Korea Targeted U .S . ICS Com-
panies, Breached Energy Firm,” Cyberscoop,
October 10, 2017, https: / /www .cyberscoop
.com /north -korea -ics -hacking -dhs -ics -cert /;
Andrea Mitchell and Ken Dilanian, “Experts:
North Korea Targeted U .S . Electric Power
Companies,” NBC News, October 11, 2017,
https: / /www .nbcnews .com /news /north -ko
rea /experts -north -korea -targeted -u -s -elec
tric -power -companies -n808996 .

3 . Andy Greenburg, “How Power Grid Hacks
Work and When You Should Panic,” Wired,
October 13, 2017, https: / /www .wired .com
/story /hack ing -a -power -grid -in -three -not -so
-easy -steps / .

4 . Nicole Perlroth and Clifford Krauss, “A Cy-
berattack in Saudi Arabia Had a Deadly

In contrast with its kinetic counterpart,
the tools used by cyber criminals and
cyber terrorists may be identical, the

only difference being the ideology
and political motivations behind the

attacks of the latter rather than
the personal or financial aspects of

the criminal element.

The international legal response to
cyber terrorism is left in somewhat of

a quandary. In the absence of a serious
cyber terror incident to focus the

political will of states, those wishing to
provide an international framework for

cyber terror regulation must resort to
soft law measures and work with other

like-minded actors to provide guidelines
for future action.

f a l l 2 0 1 8 , V o l u m e X I X 49

t H e t H r e a t o f c y B e r t e r r o r I s m a n D w H a t t o D o a B o u t I t

Goal . Experts Fear Another Try,” The New
York Times, March 15, 2018, https: / /www .ny
times .com /2018 /03 /15 /technology /saudi -ara
bia -hacks -cyberattacks .html .

5 . The hackers had accused the French president,
François Hollande, of having committed “an
unforgivable mistake” by getting involved in “a
war that serves no purpose.” They continued,
“That’s why the French received the gifts of
Charlie Hebdo and Hyper Cacher in January.”
In December 2014, a spate of attacks including
a stabbing and two vehicle rammings had oc-
curred in the cities of Joué -Lès -Tours, Dijon and
Nantes . The following month, further attacks
at the Charlie Hebdo offices and Hypercacher
supermarket in Paris resulted in the killing of
seventeen people and the three gunmen . For
a timeline and summary of attacks in France,
see “Timeline: Attacks in France,” BBC News,
July 26, 2016, http: / /www .bbc .com /news
/world -europe -33288542 .

6 . Mary Dejevsky, “Why We Needn’t Fear the
Isis Hackers,” The Guardian, April 9, 2015,
https: / /www .theguardian .com /commentis
free /2015 /apr /09 /isis -hackers -tv5 -monde -cy
ber .

7 . Angelique Chrisafis and Samuel Gibbs, “French
Media Groups to Hold Emergency Meet-
ing after Isis Cyber -Attack,” The Guardian,
April 9, 2015, https: / /www .theguardian .com
/world /2015 /apr /09 /french -tv -network -tv
5monde -hijacked -by -pro -isis -hackers .

8 . Although Russia is currently allied to the Syr-
ian regime in the non -international armed
conflict, in April 2015 France’s involvement
in the conflict was limited to airstrikes in Iraq
solely against ISIS targets . Airstrikes against
ISIS in Syria did not begin until September
2015 . Syria requested Russia’s assistance at the
same time against ISIS targets as well as other
rebel groups involved in the conflict .

Intelligence analysts speculate that the at-
tack was most likely an attempt to test forms
of cyber weaponry as part of an increasingly
aggressive posture . Gordon Corera, “How
France’s TV5 Was Almost Destroyed by ‘Rus-
sian Hackers,’” BBC News, October 10, 2016,
http: / /www .bbc .com /news /technology -37
590375 .

9 . For example, the United Kingdom .
10 . See, generally, Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in

International Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016) .

11 . Ibid ., chapter 3 .
12 . Protocol Supplemental to the Convention for

the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Air-
craft (10 September 2010) ICAO Doc 9959;
Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation
(adopted September 10, 2010, not yet entered
into force), ICAO Doc 9960 .

13 . Ben Saul and Kathleen Heath, “Cyber Terror-
ism,” in Research Handbook on International
Law and Cyberspace, ed . Nikolaos K . Tsa-
gourias and Russell Buchan (Cheltenham: Ed-
ward Elgar Publishing, 2015), 147 –67, 152 .

14 . Respectively, Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, art 1(c); Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety
of Maritime Navigation, art 3(d); Protocol for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Con-
tinental Shelf, art 2(1)(d); cited in Saul and
Heath, “Cyber Terrorism,” 154 .

15 . International Convention for the Suppression
of Terrorist Bombings 1997, 2149 UNTS 256
(adopted December 15, 1997, entered into
force May 23, 2001), Art 2(1).

16 . Calvin Biesecker, “DHS Led Team Dem-
onstrates That Commercial Aircraft Can Be
Remotely Hacked,” Defense Daily, Novem-
ber 8, 2017, http: / /www .defensedaily .com
/dhs -led -team -demonstrates -commercial -air
craft -can -remotely -hacked /?fullview=1 ; Kim
Zetter, “Feds Say That Banned Researcher
Commandeered a Plane,” Wired, May 15, 2015
https: / /www .wired .com /2015 /05 /feds -say
-banned -researcher -commandeered -plane / .
(citing example of on -board hacking of an
entertainment system allowing access to the
thrust controllers of the plane) .

17 . Nicole Perlroth, “Hackers Are Targeting Nu-
clear Facilities, Homeland Security Dept . and
F .B .I . Say,” The New York Times, July 6, 2017,
https: / /www .nytimes .com /2017 /07 /06 /tech
nology /nuclear -plant -hack -report .html ; Sean
Lyngaas, “Hacking Nuclear Systems Is the Ul-

50 g e o r g e t o w n j o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t I o n a l a f f a I r s

H e a t H e r a . H a r r I s o n D I n n I s s

timate Cyber Threat . Are We Prepared?” The
Verge, last modified January 23, 2018, https: / /
www .theverge .com /2018 /1 /23 /16920062
/hacking -nuclear -systems -cyberattack .

18 . UN Draft Convention Art 2 . UN General
Assembly, letter dated 3 August 2005 from
the Chairman of the Sixth Committee to the
President of the General Assembly, UN Doc .
A /59 /894, Appendix II, Augustust 12, 2005 .

19 . Corera, “France’s 5TV .”
20 . Chrisafis and Gibbs, “French Media Groups .”
21 . There is a legitimate question to be asked re-

garding whether the attack can be said to be
carried out by a non -state armed force in the
context of an armed conflict governed by IHL,
and thus removed from the scope of the Draft
Convention by its Art 20(2); however, that is
beyond the scope of the present article .

22 . Jean -Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald –

Beck, Customary International Humanitarian
Law (Geneva: International Committee of the
Red Cross, 2005), Rule 2 . Specific treaty ob-
ligations may found in Art 33, Geneva Con-
vention VI; Art 51(2) Additional Protocol I;
Art 4(2)(d) and 13(2) Additional Protocol II .
Terrorism offenses have been included in the
Statutes of the International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia, International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special
Court for Sierra Leone and the Special Tribu-
nal for Lebanon .

23 . Saul and Heath, “Cyber Terrorism,” 162 .
24 . See, for example, Peter W . Singer, “The Cy-

ber Terror Bogeyman,” Brookings Institution,
last modified November 1, 2012, https: / /www
.brookings .edu /articles /the -cyber -terror -bo
geyman / .

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